

# **URBAN VIOLENCE AND EMERGING LAND AND HOUSING MARKETS IN JOS, NIGERIA**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Urban violence in the form of ethnic and religious conflicts/crises and even open warfare have been on the increase in many African cities in the recent years. These conflicts/crises have different historical origins and causation factors and show different dimensions in terms of scale and intensity. The bottom line, however, is that most of them are the result of intense and bitter competition for political power, the control of limited economic, social and environmental resources. Jos, the capital of Plateau State in Nigeria, a recent city by all accounts; the centre of the tin industry during the colonial period (1900 to 1960), has always had the potential for active conflicts giving its diversity and attractive weather and abundant natural resources which have attracted various people to settle in it. In the last 15 years, the city has witnessed three major communal crises which were ethnic-religious in nature resulting in the loss of many lives and property. These crises have had profound influence on inter-group relations, attitudes and perception on where one lives and who ones neighbours are. They have ushered new trends in residential mobility and influenced emerging new land and housing markets in Jos. The trend is towards ethnic and religious cleavages (niches) (re-tribalization of the city) which exert intense pressure on land and housing markets in some areas and the abandonment of others. The current process is as much the result of rapid urbanization and population growth as it is influenced by the need for security, identity and social solidarity.

**KEY words: Urban Violence, residential mobility, land and housing markets, development pressure, Jos, Nigeria.**

## **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

Urban violence in various forms and magnitude has been on the increase globally in the recent years. Whether these are minor crimes (theft, house breaking, mocking, perpetuated by street children or gang warfare related to drugs and the control of the gang market in Latin America,

gun running and shooting in America or the well planned and executed mass attacks by well organized militants (terrorists) in the western countries, like el Qaeda, etc, or in fact the open communal conflicts and wars in Africa, the realism is that the phenomena of violence has become a major concern world wide. This may become even more so in an increasingly globalizing and competitive world where access to opportunities are narrowing in light of the recent global economic melt down. The incidences of violence would increase unless very pro-active policies and measures are taken to minimize and control it.

News papers and the electronic media are replete with reports of heinous crimes and acts violence perpetrated by individuals and groups on innocent people and communities, the effects of which is the retardation of national and local development. This has drawn interest and attention from development scholars and policy makers.. The economic impacts of violence have been associated with poverty, inequality and exclusion which have been seen as a development concern (see Moser and Mcilwaine, 2006; Fajnzylber, et al 2000, WHO 2002; Anyanbola, 2007). In Africa, large scale community conflicts have indeed led to displacement and mass movement of people, exacerbating the problems of poverty, exclusion and growing mistrust among different groups in society bringing into the fore in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the ethnic issue. Although a lot has been done in analyzing conflicts and violence and its impacts; social, economic, political, etc not much research exists on the impacts of violence on urban housing and land markets.

In Nigeria about 100,000 people have been killed through communal and sectarian violence since 1979 (**The Nation** of 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2009, p9; see also, **TELL Magazine** No 32 and 33 of August 10<sup>th</sup> and August 17<sup>th</sup> 2007 respectively for an outline on some of these), and approximately more than 500,000 displaced from their places of abode. There is no accurate data on where these people end up living, why they move to certain locations and not others, and the type of housing they occupy in their new locations and the impacts of such movements on the urban housing and land market, house prices, rents and the prices of land. We do not also know how this has influenced for example, the spatial growth of cities, urban planning policies, the access to urban services, etc.

The objective of this paper is to examine how communal conflicts in Jos (1994, 2001, 2002 and 2008) have influenced housing and land markets in the city. The paper will provide some background information to these acts of violence within the context of the origin, growth and development of the city, the demands of the various groups and inter-group dynamics which has propelled the spirit of ‘entrenched bitterness/hatred’ and ‘we’ against ‘them’ attitude; the response by various groups in terms of the need for ‘ecological dominance’ and spatial preferences and how these attitudes are influencing housing and urban land markets.

## **2.0 THE CONCEPT OF URBAN VIOLENCE**

Although the term violence is very commonly used, there is no acceptable definition of what it really connotes, and what acts constitute violence and which do not. In some societies, for example, child beating is seen as a form of discipline, in others it is child abuse and violence against children. Some form of ‘domestic violence’ would appear normal cultural practice in some societies, while in others, it is not just condemnable but would constitute a crime punishable

by law. It would then appear that there could be cultural variations in the way that violence is perceived and treated.

Keane (1996) (as quoted in Moser and Mcilwaine 2006), see violence as the use of physical force which cause injury to others in order to impose one's wishes. Others have broadened the definition to include psychological damage, material deprivation and symbolic disadvantage (see Moser and Mcilwaine 2006). Salmi (1993) has widened the definition of violence even further when he noted that 'most people think of violence in a narrow context, equating it with images of war, murders or riots. Yet, violence comes in many more forms. The range of phenomena that could be induced under this label is quite extensive. If one accepts the notions that any act that threatens a person's physical or psychological integrity is a form of violence, then one needs to consider that occurrences as diverse as racism, pollution or poverty can be symptoms of violent situation' (quoted by Obadare 1999). In this sense, racial policies and actions whether violently expressed or not can be regarded as acts of violence.

Obadare (1999) differentiates between what he calls passive and repressive violence. The military by taking power and employing undemocratic methods to rule and impose its will on the people is seen as repressive violence, while failure to address the problem of poverty in richly endowed country like Nigeria by all types of governments is also regarded as violence against the people.

Violence can be by individuals or by groups. We are interested here in collective violence by groups arising from communal conflicts. The Wikipedia defines collective violence as;

...collective violence result when individuals engage in violent activities at a group or institutional level. Like personal violence, incidents of group violence such as riots, revolutions, and gang warfare are typically viewed as local events, tied to a specific cause or geographical region. Nevertheless, group violence possesses its own unique dynamics and is generally more destructive than personal violence. Sociologists and psychologists have observed that individual members participating in group violence frequently feel less responsibility for their activities and are willing to commit greater atrocities because they are acting in the name of a higher cause, be it religion, political beliefs, or loyalty to an ethnic group or nation.

This definition appears to capture rather well the kind of violence that has characterized the ethno-religious crises that have occurred in the Jos in the past decade and a half, and which had witnessed large scale destruction of lives, properties; churches mosque, schools, shops, etc. It is not straight forward to equate violence with a particular motive or cause. Robben and Nordstrom (1995), have shown that violence is increasingly seen as complex, chaotic and multidimensional. This appears to be the case with the violence crises in Jos as would be shown later.

Due to problems in conceiving and defining what violence really is, Obadare (1999) has rightly noted that the literature tends to cause more intellectual confusion than clarity, particularly over the meaning, causes, nature, possibilities and social utility of violence. He notes that violence is inherent in every social formation regardless of the nature of its political forces and levels of development.

Moser and Mcilwaine (2006) have categorized violence into four main types; political, institutional, economic and social violence. These are based on the motives to gain and maintain power. Social violence relates to the use of power in social relations and could be gender based, ethnic violence, violence among peers or gang violence. Economic violence is motivated by the desire to obtain material gain and may include theft, mugging, armed robbery, kidnapping, gang violence to control drugs market, etc. Institutional violence on the other hand relates to violence perpetuated by public organs, institutions and the state; the police, the judiciary, the army, government departments etc. Political violence is driven by the desire to win and hold political power; and these would include, electoral rigging, voter intimidation, the use of political touts to harass opponents, to the extreme cases of political assassinations. Examples of all these forms of violence can be found in Nigeria in abundance. Many writers have argued that the long years of military rule in Nigeria, had in fact instituted institutional violence and raised other forms of violence to state policy (Obadare, 1999). Corruption by the military rulers and indeed democratic governments in Nigeria has planted the attitude of mistrust of leaders among the citizens, facilitated cheating by people in positions and in turn entrenched poverty and deprivations to large sections of the society. Poor governance coupled with culturally plurality of the Nigerian society (with over 250 major ethnic groups), and two major religions (with about 50-50 percent Christians and Muslims) makes violence not only latent but very germane.

Many theories have been advanced as to the causes of violence, the ‘ecological model’ relating to the upbringing of children, lack of parental care, child abuse, etc to the structural, institutional and interpersonal models. Structural violence is induced by the inequality in the distribution of resources in society. In Nigeria, 10% of the people own or control about 90% of the resources and this situation creates despondency and feelings of oppression and marginalization by the majority. The number of people living below the poverty level in the country is over 70%. (World Bank, 1996). Other approaches to the causes of violence see it in terms of urbanization. Rapid urbanization in Sub Saharan African has created sprawling slums and sub standards housing, worsen poverty among urban dwellers and heighten competition for very limited resources by the burgeoning population in the cities leading to acts of aggression and violence to gain access or to control resources. The youth who constitute the majority of the urban population in Nigeria (and other developing countries), are seen as potential threat as growing unemployment in the urban areas has forced the youth into crime and violence (Sommers, 2003; Anyambola 2007). Huntington has advanced the ‘youth bulge thesis’ and projected the youths as perpetrators of violence in all societies (see Sommers, 2005). Although youth unemployment has increased significantly in Nigeria over the last 20 years (about 12% in some cities), the problem of youth involvement in violence is due largely to the lack of their integration into society.

### **3.0 URBAN VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA**

Chief Obafemi Awolowo had expressed the view that Nigeria was just a geographical expression. This he meant that the country was nothing less than an amalgam of different and disparate ethnic nationalities. How true, his statement has been because with almost half a century of independence, the country is much further away from nationhood than it was in 1960 at

independence. In 1914 Sir Fredrick Lugard had amalgamated the southern and northern protectorates to form Nigeria. The country has witnessed a bitter civil war (the Biafran insurrection in the late 1960s) in which over two million people were said to have lost their lives. It has been characterized with political instability and brutal military rule for over 30 years. The present government is the longest democratic dispensation in the country since independence (10years). In the last 20 years, the country has witnessed violent ethno-religious crises, the Zango Kataf pogrom of the 1990s pitched against the indigenes who are mainly Christians and settlers who are mainly Muslims in southern Kaduna; the Maitasine religious uprising of the 1980s; the Sharia riots in most parts of northern states in this century (12 states in northern Nigeria had declared Sharia system since 1999) and the Niger Delta crisis in the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta creeks which an amnesty was recently declared by the Federal government. Even more recently, there has been the *Boko Haram* religious jihad in some cities in the north; Bauchi, Gombe, Damaturu, Maiduguri and kano in which over 1000 people were killed, millions worth of properties destroyed and more than 10,000 people displaced. The sect led, Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed by the police, preached a radical Islamic theology that western education is sin and had to be prohibited. Olurode and Oshodi (2009) have suggested that their detest for western education could be due to the fact that most leaders who had acquired western education were not living exemplary lives as they were very corrupt and were seen as the cause of the growing poverty in the country (see, **The Guardian** of Monday August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2009 p73).

Violent communal crises are on the increase in Nigeria, and there is no part of the country that is not affected in one way or the other, from the Jukun-Tiv crisis in the central zone to the incessant community conflicts and crisis in the South Eastern zone, the Niger Delta militancy in the South-South and the spate of armed robbery almost everywhere. Lagos is reputed to be second only to Johannesburg in South Africa in terms of gun related victimization in Africa (Muggah, nd). In Kaduna, the number of people subscribing to private security companies (PSC) has tripled between 1997 and 2001 (Muggah, nd). This is due to the lack of confidence in the police and other security outfits in provide protection to the people. Militant vigilante groups have also emerged in many cities because the Nigerian to combat the rising incidences of violence crimes, for example; the Bakassi Boys, the Oduduwa Peoples Congress (OPC), etc. The increasing incidence of violent crimes is evident in the number of books, conference proceedings and papers published on the subject of recent (see, for example, Albert, et al 1994; Nnoli 2003; Otite and Albert 1999; Babawale 2003; Best 2006 & 2007; Gyuse, 2006); and the number of specialized centres for conflict resolution and management.

#### **4. URBAN VIOLENCE IN JOS.**

The Jos-Bukuru Urban Complex which today contains more than 1million people, up from over 600,000 in 1991 and 155,000 in 1973 is a recent city by Nigerian standard, as it is just over a 100 years old compared with other traditional cities in the north and south of the country some of which are over 1000 years. Jos started as small mining town about 1904 and the demand for tin ore led to its rapid growth in population and physical size. The tin industry attracted people from

diverse backgrounds and nationalities both from within and outside the country. Large numbers of people were attracted to the mine camps either for as mine labourers or for trading (see Freund 1981, Jacobs 1997). Large numbers of Hausa Fulani came to the Jos Plateau at that time as miners (many through the policy of force labour imposed by the colonial government during the Second World War). In the 1940s, there were over 200 mining camps on the Jos Plateau and over 40,000 mine population. The Igbo, Orhobo came into Jos as craftsmen in the mines and for commerce. The Yorubas migrate for commerce. With the rail line extended from Zaria to Jos in 1914, the town started witnessing rapid economic and social development. By independence in 1960, Jos was about the most cosmopolitan town in Nigeria.

The indigenous people were hostile to foreign mining interest and did not join the mines nor moved into the mining camps to settle. This led to the colonial masters adopting different administrative systems for the ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in the mining camps and towns. This was to lay the seeds for the rivalry and friction between the ‘natives’ and the ‘settlers’, which over time has metamorphosed into open violence between the two groups.

Since the colonial times there have been many incidences of violence in Jos and the Jos Plateau tin mines.

- In the 1940s, the Berom disrupted operations in many mines because they were alarmed at the destruction of their farm lands and lack of compensation (see, Freund 1981, Dung-Gwom 2007);
- In 1945, there were crises between the Hausa Fulani and the Igbos on allocation of market stalls.
- There were acrimonious competition to control the administration of the Jos Native Authority between the indigenous Berom and the Hausa Fulani.
- The creation of the institution of paramount ruler for Jos, the Gbong Gwom Jos in 1945, opened further wounds between the Berom and Hausa Fulani on the one hand between the Berom and the other indigenous ethnic groups (the Naraguta, Afizire and Irigwe) on the other.
- In 1972 there were crises over the appointment of the traditional ruler of Jos, the Gbong Gwom Jos which led many Hausa Fulani people leaving the city to Jos to a border town in Bauchi state, Narabi.
- The uneasy relations between the ‘indigenes’ and the ‘settlers’ led to the physical violence which the city witnessed in 1994, 2001, 2002 and 2008.

The 1994 crisis and violence were caused by the demand by the Hausa Fulani for the institution and installation of an emirate council in Jos under an Emir. Youths were used to burn tyres,

causing mayhem and parts of the Jos Modern Market was burn down. Also central in the demand of the Hausa Fulani was the issue of indigeneship, which led to the setting up of the Justice Fereberesima Judicial Commission of inquiry, whose report was not implemented when another more violent crisis engulfed the city in on September 7<sup>th</sup> 2001. The immediate cause was the dispute that ensued between the ‘indigenes’ and the ‘settlers’ on the other hand over the appointment of a Hausa- Fulani person as the state Director of NAPEP (National Programme of Poverty Eradication). The crisis took rather ethno-religious dimension and number of lives was lost and property destroyed or damaged. The crisis soon spread to other parts of the state with very disastrous consequences. This led to the imposition of a six month emergency rule in the state by the Federal Government from May 2004. The areas mostly affected by the violence in Jos in 2001, were:

- Anguwan Rogo (a neighbourhood near the Bauchi Road Campus of the the University of Jos, which hitherto had housed a sizeable number of staff and students of the University).
- Anguwan Rimi, adjacent to Anguwan Rogo.
- Congo Russia
- Nasarawa
- Rikkos
- Jenta Adamu and Jenta Mangoro

These are run down areas inhabited by mainly the poor.

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of May 2002, political disputes during the primaries of Peoples Democratic Party in Naraguta Ward of the city led to disagreements and wide scale violence and destruction of lives and property.

The location elections of 27<sup>th</sup> December 2008, became yet another excuse to unleash another round of terror and violence on the city and its people along ethno-religious lines. The Hausa Fulani afraid of imminent lost of the local government council in North Jos, sparked off in early hours of 28<sup>th</sup> December 2009, which after about a week of clashes had left more than 700 people dead (from official sources), 50 churches destroyed, 11 vandalized and so were a number of mosques. The number of people displaced was over 10,000 (Christian Association of Nigeria, CAN Memorandum to the House of Representative Ad Hos Committee on the Jos Crisis, reproduced in **The Word of Life** Magazine of January 2009, at page 5). The claims and demands of the main contending groups in the Jos crisis are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

**Table 1: Claims and Demands of the Indigenes**

S/No	Claims and Demands
1	Autochonous inhabitants own the land (see themselves as sons of the soil/landlords).
2	Fear political, economic, and culturally domination by the Hausa Fulani.
3	See the Hausa Fulani as being aloof and having a superiority complex.
4	Creation of Jos North LGC favours the Hausa Fulani
5	Need to revisit the creation of Jos North in its present form
6	Hausa Fulani are settlers, and can only enjoy citizens rights like other ethnic groups in the city, the Igbo, Yorubas, Orhobo etc.
7	Other ethnic groups outside their areas of origin in the country are treated likewise, and the principles of federal character and quota system have been introduced to address this.

For detail discussion on these see Dung; Best (2007); Danfulani.....Berom Elders Council's (BEC) Memo to the Ajibola Judicial Panel on the November 28, 2008 Jos Crisis, Alubo 2009.

**Table 2: Claims and Demands of the Hausa Fulani**

S/No	Claims and Demands
1	That they own Jos, that the city was founded by them
2	That they did not meet any group, and so did not need to fight
3	They have lived long enough in Jos and have no other place of origin than Jos (constituted themselves into a Jasawa community)
4	Claim rulership that rulership of the city during the colonial period was under them; and so wants an Emir installed and the Gbong Gwom Jos to relocate outside Jos.
5	Want political control of Jos North LGC and the city
6	Want indigene certificates and not residents' certificates

For detail discussion on these see Dung, 1994; Best (2007); Danfulani.....Berom Elders Council's (BEC) Memo to the Ajibola Judicial Panel on the November 28, 2008 Jos Crisis, Alubo 2009.

## 5 METHODOLOGY

The study was achieved by carrying out an intensive literature review on the concept of urban violence. The factors responsible for the repeated urban violence in Jos were identified and presented. Data on cost of land, residential property rental and sales values were collected through field survey and from records of previous studies. Analyses involved drawing up trends in rental and sales values and cost of land over a period of time in relation to periods when urban violence occurred in Jos. The emerging activities in relation to land and housing market were analyzed against the reoccurrence of urban violence in Jos. The features of inner city and peri-urban areas were observed and also presented. Data presentation was achieved by employing tabulation technique and pictorial representation.

## 6 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

## **6.1 URBAN VIOLENCE AND INFLUENCE ON EMERGING HOUSING AND LAND MARKETS.**

Urban violence affects housing and land in very direct and subtle manner. Directly when, there is a surge in housing values and rents in some parts of the city and fall in housing and land values in others. Subtlety, as violence impacts on the long term attractiveness of a particular city. Magaji (2008) had showed that due to the number of crises in Kaduna metropolis over the last decade, there has been a process of residential segregation along religious lines, dividing the city into predominantly Christian and Muslim areas.

Ethnic differentiation has been a factor of most Nigerian cities, but the spade of ethno-religious violence is entrenching the divide in the cities along ethnic, cultural and religious lines. In the case of Jos, the general trend has been as follows:

### **6.2 Moving to the peri-urban areas:**

The peri-urban areas have witnessed a surge in the growth of urban land uses and activities (Dung-Gwom, 2008). This has been an on-going process for quite a long time due to the rapid increase in urban population and urbanization. The rate of growth has accelerated more in the peri-urban areas in the last decade and thus can be attributed to the influence of the violence as people try to escape from inner city areas that are prone to violence and most affected during crises. There have been massive movements of Christians from the inner city areas of Gangare, Sarkn Arab, Abba Nashehu, Rikkos, Anguwna Rimi, Dilimi, Yan Keke and Anguwan Rogo Areas. Many of them lost their properties there in 2001 and 2008 crises.

The types of housing in the peri-urban areas are mainly bungalows, duplexes and block of flats built at medium or low density. Most houses are carrying modern design, built with a mix of conventional and alternative materials and the plot sizes are as recommended by the State Development Authority.

### **6.3 Congestion in the central areas:**

The central areas have been congested even before the crises, but are witnessing even more congestion and high occupancy rates. These are areas occupied by mostly Hausa Fulani who are Muslims, and other areas by the Igbos and southern groups, for example, Jenta Apata, Vanderpuye, Tafawa Balewa. The Hausa Fulani do not feel safe in the peri-urban areas and so congest in the inner areas where they are predominant.

In the central areas, these are mainly tenement and old traditional houses, some built of mud and few with conventional materials. The influx of people into inner city areas of Gangare, Sarkn Arab, Abba Nashehu, Rikkos, Anguwna Rimi, Dilimi, Yan Keke and Anguwan Rogo Areas of Jos have led to an emerging activities and features as presented in Table 3. The common activities and features observed range from increased sale of properties, fragmentation of plots, conversion of residential dwellings to commercial use (shops), especially properties along streets, vertical extension of dwellings during renovations etcetera.

**Table 3: Emerging Activities and Features Observed in the Inner City of Jos**

<b>Activity or Features Observed</b>	<b>Remark</b>
Fragmentation of plots	Standard plots of 30m x 15m ( $450\text{m}^2$ ) are being fragmented into smaller plots of 15m x 10m ( $150\text{m}^2$ ) by land owners or speculators to be sold to prospective home owners to develop residential houses.
Congested development	Residential buildings are constructed without observing development and planning regulations such as plot size and coverage, setbacks, front edge of plot to edge of road, landscaping, accessibility etcetera as set out by the State Development Board
Conversion of Buildings	There is high rate of conversion of residential dwelling to commercial (shops), especially properties situated along main streets. This trend accelerated shortly after the Jos Ultra Modern market was burned down by unknown persons in February 2002. Thousands of traders were displaced from the market into the streets of Jos, creating new demand for shops.
Vertical extension of residential buildings	As a result of increase in demand for residential dwellings, house owners within the inner city started converting their obsolete houses into storey buildings of between 2 to 4 stories in order to meet demand.

Field Survey 2009

#### **6.4 Trends in Residential Housing Values and Rents in Jos**

The market value (sales and rental) of residential properties have been on the increase, the trend suggest a continuous gradual rise over time. The rise is partly attributed to forces of demand and supply and the increase in cost of construction and partly to demand created as a result of displacement of people from their places of abode to other locations due to urban violence.

For the purpose of illustration, a trend in the average annual rental value and sales value of 4 bedroom bungalow is established for low, medium and high density areas in Jos from 1991 – 2009 and presented in Fig 1 and 2 respectively. Though forces of demand and supply and cost of construction largely determine residential rentals in Jos, it is however observed in Fig 1 that there was a sharp rise in rent of 4 bedroom bungalow from 2003 through 2006 and between 2008 and 2009. These coincide with periods when crises occurred in Jos as earlier discussed.

Fig 1: Trend in Average Annual Rental Value of 4 Bedroom Bungalow in Jos (2001-09)





Fig 2 presents a trend in the sales value of 4-bedroom bungalow for low, medium and high density areas in Jos between 2001 and 2009. The sales value of 4-bedroom bungalow in low density areas increased gradually from 2001 until 2005 when a sharp rise was observed, which continued till 2009. Low density areas in Jos have not been affected by ethno-religious crises that have occurred in Jos over time, as such they are considered as safe zones. This allows us to conclude that along side other factors that are responsible for establishing property prices, there has been a continuous increase in demand for 4-bedroom bungalow from 2005 through 2009 by people displaced from the inner city areas after 2001 and 2008 ethno-religious crisis.

Fig 2: Trends in Average Sales Value of 4 Bedroom Bungalow in Jos from (2001 - 2009)




In the medium areas there has been a gradual appreciation in the sales value of 4-bedroom bungalow while the high density areas have witnessed a very slower appreciation in the sales values of such class of property. Most of the crises that have occurred in Jos over time often start from the high density areas which are mostly in the inner city of Jos. People have been compelled to sell their houses in order to relocate to peri-urban areas that are considered more safe by them. Sale values of property in areas affected by crises are not often established through arms length transactions as such values arrived at are usually ‘forced sale values’ and not ‘open market values’. This explains why the sales of 4-bedroom bungalow have not reasonably appreciated in high and medium density areas in Jos.

## 6.5 Trends in Cost of Land in Jos

The demand for land in Jos has been sustained across all locations despite the reoccurrence of urban violence. While the practice of transacting fragmented plots of land is gaining currency in the inner city areas, the cost of land has continually appreciated across the peri-urban areas. For the purpose of illustration, a trend in the average cost of land in some selected peri-urban areas cutting across low, medium and high density zones is presented in Fig 3.

**Figure 3: Trends in Cost of Land in Selected Peri-urban Areas of Jos**



The cost of land is higher in the low density peri-urban areas compared to medium and high density areas. While the low and medium density peri-urban areas have maintained a steady rise in the cost of land, the cost of land in the high density peri-urban areas has continually fluctuated.

## 6.6 Planning and Development Control in Jos

Poor planning and control of development is observed within the inter city and peri-urban areas of Jos and there is also poor level of infrastructure development. Though there are statutory bodies responsible for enforcing planning laws and regulation of development in Jos, but this can be more effective within a framework of a Master plan. It was observed that the Jos-Bukuru Master

Plan expired since 2000, though its implementation was very dismal. Government is currently updating the moribund Jos-Bukuru Master Plan, but how this new master plan will affect the development of the city and its current trend of racial and cultural segregation is yet unknown.

## **6.7 The Role of Faith Organizations, NGOs and CBOs**

Many faith organizations and CBOs have encouraged the people affected by the violent crises not to sale their properties and move out of the localities, as they see this as resulting into ‘ethnic cleansing’. They have therefore rendered financial support to such people to repair or rebuilt their houses. A number of households have moved back to their former houses.

## **7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on findings of the study and to reduce the incidences of ethno-religious violence in Jos, the following recommendations are advanced:

- 1) There is need to resolve the lingering issue of ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ in Jos: The struggle for land ownership and control of Jos is the remote cause of repeated crises that have occurred in Jos over time, but government has not done much in resolving this issue. Since this is a constitutional matter, the state and federal governments should work together address the issue and clearly define the rights and privileges of ‘indigenes’ and others which guarantees their basic fundamental rights and addresses the fears of the minorities.
- 2) Cordial intergroup relations should be promoted by residents of Jos. This can be achieved by the activities traditional, religious and political leaders. Government and Non-Government Organizations should also collaborate in promoting intergroup harmony and peaceful co-existence. The Hausa Fulani has to be convinced to partake in peace conference the like of 2004, which they fail to endorse at the end to resolve contending matters, rather than to boycott it.
- 3) There is need for Government to implement the recommendations of Judicial Commissions of Inquiry into the causes of ethno-religious and political crises that have occurred in Jos over time. Perpetrators of violence should be punished irrespective of their socio-political status in the society. This will go a long in forestalling the reoccurrences of such crises in Jos.
- 4) Good urban governance can be achieved by addressing the needs of the poor, disadvantage and ethnic peculiarities. Youth empowerment should be embark upon so that idle youths who are often taken advantage of by high placed individuals to achieve their selfish gains will be engaged in meaning economic activities and have a sense of belonging in the society.
- 5) There is need for land reform so as to improve on the current cumbersome procedures of getting access to land for all kinds of development in Nigeria at large. This can be achieved through a constitutional amendment that will allow for divorcing the Land Use

Act from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, so that its provisions can be reviewed to accommodate changing circumstances.

- 6) Provision of urban infrastructure at the inner city and peri urban areas is very important. This can be achieved through Public Private Partnership and community participation. There should be programme for vigorous slum upgrading to improve the living conditions of people in such areas which are very prone violence.
- 7) Crime Control through Environmental Design is a strategy that has been employed in cities very prove to crimes and violence, and appropriate design strategies should be adopted in Jos.
- 8) To control and management the incidences of violence, particularly communal violence in Nigeria, there is a need for a holistic approach which addresses judicial processes, human rights, poverty and corruption.

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**APPENDIX 'I'**  
**TRENDS IN COST OF LAND PER PLOT IN SOME SELECTED PERI URBAN AREAS IN JOS**

YEARS	AVERAGE COST PER PLOT FOR DIFFERENT ZONES		
	LOW DENSITY	MEDIUM DENSITY	HIGH DENSITY
1990	27000	16650	13500
1991	32625	22850	13500
1992	39375	27900	18000
1993	47250	34500	27000
1994	50625	38700	27000
1995	61875	44100	27000
1996	67500	48600	31500
1997	77500	51300	31500
1998	91125	66600	54000
1999	102375	72000	67500
2000	113625	78300	72000
2001	144000	98100	90000
2002	160875	116100	94500
2003	174375	133200	144000
2004	191250	151200	180000
2005	204750	159300	184500
2006	222863	177930	180000
2007	255150	202950	199800
2008	303625	224550	270000
2009	331875	252900	279000

Source: Dung-Gwom and Rikko 2007; Field Survey 2009

**Note:**

Low Density Areas: Wada GRA, Liberty Bouvevard, Rayfield,

Medium Density Areas: Rock Haven, NTA Neighbourhood, Maingo Road, Metropolitan (Tudun Wada)

High Density Areas: Apata, Nasarawa, Bauchi Ring Road, Jos Central

**APPENDIX 'II'**  
**AVERAGE ANNUAL RENTAL VALUES FOR 4 BEDROOM BUNGALOWS IN JOS.**

Year	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density
2001	80,000	60,000	40,000
2002	96,000	72,000	50,000
2003	125,000	85,000	60,000
2004	180,000	100,000	75,000
2005	250,000	150,000	100,000
2006	275,000	170,000	120,000
2007	300,000	180,000	150,000
2008	350,000	200,000	180,000
2009	400,000	250,000	200,000

Source: Kingsley Odeh Estate Survey and Valuer, Jos.

**APPENDIX ‘III’**  
**AVERAGE SALES PRICES FOR 4 BEDROOM BUNGALOWS IN JOS.**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Low Density</b>	<b>Medium Density</b>	<b>High Density</b>
2001	2,460,000	2,100,000	1,300,000
2002	2,800,000	2,300,000	1,500,000
2003	3,500,000	2,500,000	1,650,000
2004	4,500,000	3,000,000	1,800,000
2005	5,000,000	3,500,000	2,000,000
2006	8,000,000	4,000,000	2,200,000
2007	12,000,000	5,000,000	2,500,000
2008	15,000,000	5,500,000	2,800,000
2009	20,000,000	6,000,000	3,000,000

Source: Kingsley Odeh Estate Survey and Valuer, Jos.

Low Density Areas: Tudun Wada GRA, Liberty Bouvevard, Rayfield, Gwarandok

Medium Density Areas: Rock Haven, NTA Neighbourhood, Maingo Road, Metropolitan (Tudun Wada)

High Density Areas: Apata, Nasarawa, Bauchi Ring Road, Jos Central, Fudawa